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STATEMENT OF Tiffi CASE 
On the top of page 19 of her Brief, Ms. Reed states that she adopts Dr. Reed's Course of 
Proceedings, but then claims that this would be with the " ...... exception that the Appellant filed a 
Third Amended Notice of Appeal which was omitted from the Appellant's Course of 
Proceedings; ........ ". The Third Amended Notice of Appeal was listed in the Course of Proceedings 
section of his Appellant's Brief at page 6 in the last sentence so Ms. Reed's claim is incorrect. 
RESTATED ISSUES ON APPEAL 
I 
DID JUDGE WAYMAN ERR IN THE VALUATION AND AW ARD OF THE SHARES 
OF STOCK IN MOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., AND DID JUDGE GRJFFIN ERR IN 
AFFIRMING HIS VALUATION AND AW ARD (Unchanged) 
II 
WAS JUDGE WA '1{MA.~'S DECISION TO VALUE THE COMMERCIAL LOT IN 
PINEHlJRSTAT$15,200.00BASEDONSUBSTAt'\JTIALANDCOMPETENTEVIDENCEAND 
DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFR.\1ING JUDGE WAYMAN (Unchanged) 
III 
DID JUDGE WA ThiA.~ CORRECTLY CALCULATE MS. REED'S INCOME FOR 
PURPOSES OF SETTING A CHILD SUPPORT A WA.RD AND DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN 
AFFIRMING JUDGE WAYMAN'S CALCULATIONS (Changed) 
IV 
DID JUDGE WA Ylv1AN ERR IN AWARDING MS. REED A PORTION OF HER 
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ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS AND DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIRMING THIS 
AW ARD (Changed) 
V 
WAS IT ERROR FOR JUDGE WAYMAN TO ORDER THE TWO CORPORA. TIONS TO 
ISSUE STOCK AND DELIVER THE STOCK TO THE SHOSHONE COUNTY SHERIFF Al'JD 
DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIR.t\1ING THIS DECISION (Changed) 
RESPONDENT'S ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
VI 
THAT RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HER ATTORNEY'S FEES Al"\TD 
COSTS ON APPEAL PURSUANT TO IAR 41 AND I.C.12-121 AS PREVAILING PARTY 
ARGUMENT 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
A. FINDINGS OF FACT: 
On pages 19-21 of the RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL, Ms. Reed correctly discusses the standard of review which applies to this case and it 
appears that Dr. Reed's reliance on the standard of review concerning findings of fact as set forth 
in earlier case of Brinkmeyer was incorrect. In Brinkmeyerv. Brinkmeyer, 135 Idaho 596,598-
599, 21 P. 3d 918,920-921 (2001), the Idaho Supreme Court stated that "When this Court reviews 
a case appealed from a district court's appellate review of a magistrate's decision, the Court reviews 
the decision of the magistrate, independently of, but with due regard for the, decision of the district 
court." In Pelayo v. Pelayo 154 Idaho 855,858- 859,303 P. 3d 214. 217-218 (2013), however, the 
Idaho Supreme Court held that it does not presently directly review the findings of fact made by the 
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magistrate judge. It reviews the opinion of the district court to determine whether or not the district 
court correctly concluded that the magistrate's findings of fact were supported by substantial and 
competent evidence. 
Where the trial court's :findings of fact are concerned, the holding in Pelayo still reqmres 
the Idaho Supreme Court to review the evidence considered by the magistrate court to determine 
whether or not the district court correctly concluded that the magistrate's decision was supported by 
substantial and competent evidence. The decision the Idaho Supreme Court is reviewing, however, 
is that of the district court. 
B: CONCLUSIONS OF LAW: 
Conclusions of law are subject to a free review standard and the Supreme Court is entitled 
to draw its own conclusions from the facts presented in the record. Sims v. Daker, 154 Idaho 975, 
977,303 P. 3d 1231,1233 (2013). 
I 
DID JUDGE WA YMAL'\J ERR IN THE VALUATION AND AW ARD OF THE SHARES 
OF STOCK IN MOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC., AND DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN 
AFFIRMING JUDGE WA YMAN'S VALUATION A,_~D AW ARD. 
Ms. Reed correctly states on the bottom of page 21 of her Brief that where there is conflicting 
evidence, the court on appeal must uphold the magistrate's findings of fact. Dan ti v. Dan ti, 146 
Idaho 929,934,204 P. 3d. 1140,1145 (2009). Many of the factual errors made by Judge Wayman, 
however, when he valued the stock of Mountain Health Care, Inc., were not made based on 
conflicting evidence, but were made because he was relying on outdated information in the figures 
he used, instead of information which was current as of the second day of trial and the date of the 
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divorce on January 14, 2011. 
As a general rule, community property is to be valued as of the date of divorce. McAffee v. 
McAffee 132 Idaho 281, 289, 971 P. 2d 734,742 (Ct. App. 1999). This would include shares of 
stock. Josephson v. Josephson, 115 Idaho 1142, 1150, 772 P. 2d 1236,1244 (Ct. App. 1989). 
Because Judge Wayman ordered the marriage dissolved at the end of the second day of trial on 
January 14, 2011, (TRLAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. II, p. 439, L. 6-25), the date of the divorce was 
January 14, 2011. This was also the date to value community property and determine the amount 
of debts. 
On the top of page 22 of her Brief, Ms. Reed claims that the parties had some form of 
stipulation as to the value of the assets and debts of Mountain Health Care, Inc. as of January 14, 
2011. She further claims that the parties were bound by this stipulation. She has failed to state 
where in the record this alleged stipulation is located as she was and is required to do by I.A.R.35 
(b) ( 6) which states that" .... the argument shall contain the contention of the respondent with respect 
to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefore, and with citation to the authorities, statutes 
and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." (Emphasis added). 
The existence of this alleged stipulation is also refuted by the discrepancies between the 
values of the Mountain Health Care, Inc., real property and building as determined by the tvvo 
different experts called by the respective parties. Mr. Godbold, was called as a witness by Dr. Reed 
and he testified that the value of the real property and building was $2,500,000.00 (TRLL\.L 
TRANSCRIPT: Vol I, p. 88, L. 7-12). Mr. Moe was called as an expert witness by Ms. Reed 
(TRLAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol I, p. 3-71). His ·written report was admitted as Plaintiff's Exhibit 57 
and on page 42 of this written report, he reported that the value of the Mountain Health Care, Inc., 
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building and real property would be $4,850,000.00 if the building was built as anticipated. The 
parties had no stipulation as to the value of Mountain Health Care, Inc., real property or the amount 
of Mountain Health Care, Inc., debt. Ms. Reed has failed to show this Court where this stipulation 
exists in the record and her claim concerning a stipulation should be disregarded. 
A: DEBTS OWED BY MOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE, INC, AS OF JANUARY 14, 2011. 
On page 22 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLA.i.¾1'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. 
Reed, discusses the testimony of Todd Carlson wherein he stated that the liabilities of Mountain 
Health Care, Inc., were in the amount of $2,439,739. This identical figure can be found on the 
bottom right of Defendant's Exhibit G l and at the time the statement was prepared in December of 
2009, $2,383,252 of the debt was classified as long term debt. 
On the bottom of page 22 and the top of page 23 of her Brief, Ms. Reed states that, "The 
Appellant presented no such information and now on appeal seeks to issue Exhibit G 1 for additional 
debt." It is unclear what she means by this statement. Defendant's Exhibit Gl, was admitted by 
stipulation at trial. TRAIL TRANSCRIPT: Vol I, p. 183. L. 15-20. Dr. Reed is not seeking to 
admit Defendant's Exhibit G 1 on appeal. He is, however, using some of the figures on Defendant's 
Exhibit G 1 to show that Judge \Vayman vvas using some figures which were over a year old to value 
the assets and debts of Mountain Health Care, Inc .. 
As of the date of trial, Mountain Health Care, Inc.' s long term debt had increased to 2.8 
million according to the testimony of the office manager, Paula Olson. (TRIAL TRAl'JSCRIPT: Vol. 
II, p. 158, L. 14-22). Her testimony has been quoted on page 22 of the RESPONDENT'S REPLY 
TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL. As is shown in this quote, Ms. Olson had also sent a 
current statement concerning the loan balance to Ms. Graham within a month of trial. Had the 
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statement shown that the debt was less than 2.8 million, it would seem that Ms. Reed would have 
offered it as this would have increased the value of the Mountain Health Care, Inc .. Paula Olson's 
testimony also refutes the claim made in the last paragraph on page 25 of her RESPONDENT'S 
REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL wherein it is stated that only the Appellant and 
his experts had possession of debt information concerning Mountain Health Care, Inc .. Ms. Reed's 
attorney also possessed the information concerning the amount of the long term debt owed by 
Mountain Health Care, Inc. which had been sent to her by Ms. Olson. Paula Olson was also a fact 
witness and was not called as an expert witness nor did she testify as an expert witness despite some 
vague claims otherwise which are set forth in the RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
The amount of the long term debt owed by Mountain Health Care, Inc. as of the date of trial 
was not contradicted by any other evidence. The Idaho Supreme Court has stated that " ... We have 
previously held that a trier of fact may not arbitrarily or capriciously disregard the 'positive, 
uncontradicted testimony of a credible witness ........ In fact, the trier must accept such testimony as 
the truth unless the testimony was either 'impeached by any of the modes known to the law' or it was 
'inherently improbable or rendered so by facts and circumstances disclosed at the hearing or trial."' 
In Re Doe, 142 Idaho 594, 598, 130 P. 3d 1132,1136 (2006). The testimony was also elicited on 
cross-examination by Ms. Reed's attorney and it has been stated that " .... Evidence elicited on cross-
examination is regarded as testimony on the part of the party calling the witness."(Cite omitted). 
HAYWARD V. YOST, 72 Idaho 415,429,242 P. 2d 971,979 (1952). 
The only evidence of the amount of the building debt as of the date of trial was put into the 
record thorough the testimony of Paula Olson discussed above. The debt against the building was 
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2. 8 million and not the $2,383,739 shown on Defendant's Exhibit G 1. The debt figure for Mountain 
Health Care, Inc., used by Judge Wayman of$2,479,739.00 (TRANSCRIPT; Court's Oral Decision 
Hearing, p. 52- L. 10-13) was either taken directly off of Defendant's Exhibit Gl or from Mr. 
Carlson's testimony who also testified to this debt amount as is discussed on page 22 of the 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
Defendants' E:x,_lribit G 1 also showed that as of December 31, 2009, Mountain Health Care, 
Inc., owed accounts payable in the amount of $16,421.00 and payables to shareholders, net of 
receivables, in the amount of $38,066.00. The evidence did not establish that these debt amounts 
had changed from December 31, 2009, to January 14, 2011. Assuming that as of January 14, 2011, 
they were still owing and with 2.8 million owed on the building as of this date, the total debt owed 
by Mountain Health Care, Inc., as of January 14, 2011, would have been $2,856,487.00 and not the 
$2,479,739.00 used by Judge Wayman as is discussed above. 
B: VALUE OF THE BUSINESS ASSETS OF MOUNTAIN HEAL TH CARE, INC. 
According to Defendant's Exhibit G 1, as of December 31, 2009, Mountain Health Care, Inc., 
had other assets which consisted of cash and cash equivalents which totaled $125,590.00 and 
uncollected accounts receivable of $5,637.00 for a total of $131,227.00. As of the date of trial on 
January 14, 2011, however, Paula Olson stated that the only assets owned by Mountain Health 
Care, Inc., were the building, the land and the x-ray machine. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 156, 
L 18-23. She did not state that Mountain Health Care, Inc., still had cash and cash equivalents 
totalling $125,590.00 nor did she state that it still held $5,637.00 in accounts receivable. 
As of December 31, 2009, Mountain Health Care, Inc., owned total equipment valued at 
$243,659.00 as is stated on Defendant's Exhibit GI. According to the testimony of Paula Olson, 
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however, the assets owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc. as of the date of trial on January 14, 2011, 
were worth only $50,000.00. (TRJAL TRANSCRJPT: Vol I, p. 156, 1. 9-17). No further and 
conflicting evidence was offered at trial which showed that as of the date of trial, Mountain Health 
Care, Inc., owned more assets and/or that these additional assets were worth more than $50,000.00, 
with one possible exception. 
On page 23 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPL YTO A.PPELLAL"JT'S BRJEF ON A.PPEAL, Ms. 
Reed discusses Ms. Olson's testimony concerning the contents of the building and the amounts set 
forth on Plaintiffs Exhibit 63. Plaintiffs Exhibit 63 was a statement concerning the insurance 
coverages which were in effect for the assets of Mountain Health Care, Inc .. Page 1 of this Exhibit 
established that the personal property of Mountain Health Care, Inc, was insured for $387,000.00. 
Page 3 of this Exhibit established that the policy was for the replacement cost of the personal 
property owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc., not the fair market value. As was noted on page 23 
and 24 of the A.PPELLAL"JT'S BRIEF, replacement cost is different than fair market value as is 
further discussed in State. v. Smith, 144 Idaho 687,693, 169 P. 3d 275,281 (Ct. App. 2007). 
On voir dire, Paula Olson also testified that the insurance policy had been created in 1996. 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. 1, p. 152, L. 6-10. She stated that there had not been any changes to 
the policy since 1996 except with respect to the addition on the back of the building which had been 
added to the policy. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol 1, p. 153, L. 7-18. Plaintiffs Exhibit 63, 
therefore, did not establish that as of January 14, 2011, Mountain Health Care, Inc., held tangible 
physical assets worth $387,000.00 in addition to the real property and building. The amount is also 
contradicted by the amounts set forth in Defendant's Exhibit G 1 which states that as of December 
31, 2009, Mountain Health Care., Inc. had "Total Equipment" worth $243,659.00. 
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Further, as will be discussed below, Judge Wayman did not use $387,000.00 when he came 
up with a value for Mountain Health Care, Inc.. He used a total which was arrived at by adding the 
assets at the values shown on Defendant's Exhibit Gl,wbich included the amount of $243,659.00 
as one of the components and 4.86 million which was represented to be the value of the real property 
and building in a question posed by Ms. Graham. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. 1, p. 186, L. 5-20. 
On page 23 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPL YTO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. 
Reed states that "The Appellant relies heavily upon Exhibit 63, the Insurance Policy provided by 
Respondent at triaL" This is incorrect. Dr. Reed has always contended that Judge Wayman erred 
when he concluded that Thomas Godbold's opinion as to the value of the real property and building 
owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc., was impeached by the numbers used in Plaintiffs Exhibit 63. 
TRAt"JSCRlPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing. p. 49, L. 20-25, p.50, L. 1-20. In discussing 
Plaintiffs Exhibit 63, Judge Wayman stated that "And when I have the corporate owner of the asset 
indicating that in their corporation's opinion that we need to have $3,750,000 worth of insurance, 
after they have received an appraisal of two a.11d a half million dollars from August of earlier that 
year, I fmd that the owner's opinion directly impeaches Mr. Godbold's opinion that it is worth two 
and a half million dollars." He erred because the figure used on Plaintiffs Exhibit 63 was the 
amount necessary to replace the building and not the amount necessary to compensate Molli1tain 
Health Care, Inc., for the fair market value of the building if it was destroyed. 
On page 23 of her Brief, Ms. Reed states that "The Appellant erroneously argues that the 
Business assets would affect the business valuation." Obviously, adding the value of the personal 
property assets of Mountain Health Care, Inc, to the value of the real property and building, would 
increase the value of Mountain Health Care, Inc. and it is unclear what Ms. Reed means by this 
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statement. 
When Todd Carlson testified and used 4.86 million for the value of the land and the 
building owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc., he came up with a total of$5,234,886.00 as the value 
of all assets held by Mountain Health Care, Inc .. TRL\L TRANSCRIPT: Vol.1, p. 186, L. 19-25, p. 
187, L. 1-7. This amount is identical to the total asset value used by Judge Wayman for Mountain 
Health Care, Inc., when he announced his opnion. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearings 
p.52, L. 6-10. 
When the value of the land and building of 4.86 million is subtracted from the total of 
$5,234,866.00, the result is $374,886.00. This amount is identical to the sum arrived at by adding 
the value of the net current tangible assets of $131,227.00 from Defendant's Exhibit G l with the 
value of the total equipment of$243,659.00 from Defendant's Exhibit G 1 for a total of$374,886.00. 
By using the :figures from Defendant's Exhibit G l and from Todd Carlson, which included 
$243,659.00 for total equipment, Judge \Vaymanadded $243,659.00 to the value ofMountainHealth 
Care, foe.. The value of the equipment increased the total value of Mountain Health Care, Inc. in 
Judge Wayman's calculations. Ms. Reed's contention, therefore, that the value of the business 
assets of Mountain Health Care., Inc., would not affect the value of Mountain Health Care., Inc. is 
incorrect. 
On page 22 of her Brief, Ms. Reed quotes the testimony of Todd Carlson wherein he stated 
that when the liabilities of $2,439,739 (Defendant's Exhibit G 1) are subtracted from the net tangible 
assets of Mountain Health Care, me., the result is $2,795,147.00. Using these figures, Mr. Carlson 
stated that Dr. Reed's 22.97 ownership interest would be worth $642,045.00. This valuation was 
based on an assumed and :fictional value of the building and real property of 4.86 million (instead 
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of 4.85 million) which was provided by Ms. Reed's attorney in a question to Mr. Carlson (TRIAL 
TRANSCRIPT: Vol. I, p. 186, L. 13-18). 
After being told by Ms. Reed's attorney that he should use 4.86 million for the value of the 
land and building, Mr. Carlson was asked to state an opinion as to the value of the Mountain Health 
Care, Inc., stock and his testimony was as follows: 
"A. Ifwe remove Mr. Godbold's appraisal and we rely on Mr. Moe's appraisal, that results 
in the total assets of the subject company, Mountain Health Care, Inc., the value of the total assets 
is $5,234,886. From that, we would subtract the liabilities as already reflected. Those liabilities are 
$2,439,739 resulting in net tangible assets of$2,795,147. That's for 100 percent. And Dr. Reed's 
22.97 percent o,vnership interest would be $642,045. So 642045." 
When he announced his op inion, Judge Wayman used the exact same figures when he stated 
at TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing. p. 52, L. 6-18 that: 
"The testimony of Mr. Carlson went ahead and did some--did the computations. He used 
Mr. Moe's value of the building contents and land, added all that-those assets up and he came up 
with a total asset value of Mountain Health Care Incorporated of $5,734,886. He used the corporate 
records and determined the total liabilities that were- - of the corporation of $2,439,739. Which 
came up with a net value of $2,795,147. 
The Corp-the community ovms 22. 97 percent interest in that corporation. And again, using 
rvfr. Carlson's computation, comes up with a fair market value of $642,045 for the community 
interest in that corporation." 
Todd Carlson had previously testified that using the appraisal prepared by Mr. Godbold, Dr. 
Reed's 22.97 percent interest would be worth $100,000.00. (TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, Vol. I, p.185, 
L. 6-25, p. 186, L. 1- 9). He later testified that by using a value for the real property between Mr. 
Godbold's value and Mr. Moe's value, Dr. Reed's interest in Mountain Health Care, Inc., would be 
worth $371,000.00. (TRIAL TRANSCRIPT, Vol I, p. 188, L. 10-19). 
What should be obvious at this point is that Mr. Carlson's opinion as to the value of Dr. 
Reed's stock interest in Mountain Health Care, hie., changed based on the increases or decreases in 
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the value of the building and real property owned by Mountain Health Care., Inc., he was asked to 
use in the hypothetical questions posed by the attorneys. Increases in the value of the building and 
real property owned by Mountain Health Care, Inc., increased his opinion as to the value of the 
Mountain Health Care, Inc., stock. Decreases in the value of the real property and building owned 
by Mountain Health Care, Inc., decreased his opinion as to the value of the Mountain Health Care, 
Inc, stock. This can be explained by his testimony concerning the nature of his opinion. During 
trial, he stated as follows at TRlAL TRANSCRIPT: p. 184, L 2-6: 
"A Mountain Health Care., Inc. is essentially what we call an asset appraisal. We don't, and 
are not qualified, to provide real estate appraisals. We are qualified to use those real estate appraisals 
to determine a net asset approach method of an entity." 
He later stated on the same page at lines 16-22 that: 
"A So really there is no subjective, there's no valuation decisions being made on that. It's 
almost accounting. We're taking third-party information and putting it into a balance sheet format 
to determine what the fair market value is based on that third-party information. 
Q. Was that done here? 
A. Yes." 
As was discussed on pages 12 and 13 of the APPELLANT'S BRIEF, with appropriate 
references to the parts of the record which established the facts being discussed, Mr. Moe's 
valuation of the real property and building owned by Mountain Health Care., Inc. assumed that an 
addition with 7,595 square feet would be added to the existing building. After construction had 
started, however, the size of the addition had to be decreased so the actual addition was 7,213 square 
feet instead of7,595 square feet. While Judge Wayman declined to rely on the opinion of Thomas 
Godbold, Thomas Godbold was the only expert who appraised the building after the addition had 
been completed and "as built". Mr. Moe did not. 
In addressing these issues in his :ivfemorandum Opinion filed on April 5, 2013, Judge Griffin 
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stated on page 4 of his MEMORANDUM OPINION that : 
''Expert testimony was admitted regarding the value of the parties' community interest in 
Mountain Health Care, Inc., and Mountain Health Services, P.C. The court evaluated the credibility 
of the witnesses, and also considered Mountain Health Care, Inc,'s own valuation of their business 
property for insurance purposes. Scott argues that the court did not properly evaluate the evidence 
as to the value of the businesses' assets as of the date of trial.' 
The exact value of most of the parties' assets and debts as of the date of trial is impossible 
to establish with mathematical precision. Appraisals are done prior to, and not the day of trial; the 
fair market value of assets may appreciate or depreciate between the date of appraisal and the trial; 
the amount of debt on loans can change and if a divorce is not granted the day of trial the fair market 
value of assets can increase or decrease prior to the court's final judgment (in tl:1is case the parties 
were awarded a divorce effective the last day of trial)." (R. Vol. 5. p. 1216) 
The standard of review for the errors discussed above is not the standard of review applicable 
to fmdings of fact made by the trial court on conflicting evidence. Where Idaho law requires the 
trial court to value assets and debts as of the date of divorce and where the trial court does not do this 
but, instead, uses figures that are over a year old, it is submitted that the trial court errs as a matter 
oflaw and the standard ofreview is one of free review. As was stated in Simplot v. Simplot, 96 
Idaho 239,245,526 P.2d 844,850 (1974) ,where stock shares are not divided, but are assigned to one 
party with an offsetting amount of assets going to the other party, it is essential that the trial court 
make an accurate determination of the market value of the stock. 
Judge Waymai.---i erred as a matter of law when he failed to use current information as to the 
assets and debts of Mountain Health Care., Inc. as of the date of divorce on January 14, 2011. Judge 
Griffin also erred as a matter of law in affirming Judge Wayman. Both erred as a matter of law in 
concluding that the amounts set forth on Plaintiffs Exhibit 63 represented Mountain Health Care, 
Inc.' s opinion as to the fair market value of its assets. The fair market value of the assets listed on 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 63 was not stated. This exhibit clearly showed that the insurance company had 
agreed to pay the cost to replace items and not just to pay the fair market value for any destroyed 
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item. Judge Griffin's decision affirming Judge Wayman' s valuation and award of Mountain Health 
Care, Inc., stock should be reversed. 
The February 24, 2011, equalizing judgment should be set aside. While Dr. Reed does not 
agree that the FINDINGS OFF ACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND JUDGMENT (R. Vol. 1, p. 
104-186) constituted a judgment, the determination that a judgment should be entered against Dr. 
Reed for $198,642.00 set forth at R. Vol. 1, p. 70, L. 6-9 should also be set aside. The $198,642.00 
judgment against Dr. Reed set forth on page 11 of the Amended Final Decree of Divorce (R. Vol. 
1, p. 218) should also be set aside. Judge Griffin's decision to affirm Judge Wayman' s valuation of 
Mountain Health Care, Inc., should also be set aside. Both judges erred as a matter of law in using 
information from December of2009 instead of more recent information which existed as of Janua..ry 
14, 20111 in valuing the Mountain Health Care, Inc., stock. The matter should be remanded back 
for further proceedings. 
II 
WAS JUDGE WA YMAi."¾J'S DECISION TO VALUE THE COMMERCIAL LOT IN 
PINEHURST AT $15,200.00 BASED ON SUBSTAi'JTIALAND COMPETENT EVIDENCE AND 
DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIRL\1ING JUDGE WAYMAN 
On page 27 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLAi'\JT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. 
Reed states that Dr. Reed testified about the value of the Pinehurst lot. His testimony about the value 
of the lot is located at TRIAL TRAi'JSCRIPT: Vol. II, p. 320 and 321. Ms. Reed's attorney stated 
in a question to Dr. Reed that "But she's valued it at $15,200.00. Do you disagree with that?" 
TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. II, p. 320, L. 13-14. Dr. Reed's response was that it was not worth 
$15,200.00 and he explained his reasons for a lower value. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. II, p. 320, 
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L. 18- 25, p. 321, L. L When Dr. Reed stated that he felt the lot was worth $10,000.00, Ms. Reed's 
attorney stated that "We'll stipulate to that". TRIAL TRAl'JSCRIPT: Vol II, p. 321, L. 8-15. When 
Ms. Reed's attorney offered the further stipulation to award the lot to Dr. Reed, he declined and 
clarified that he was only stipulating to the value of the lot. TRIAL TRAi"!"SCRIPT: Vol II, p. 321, 
L. 19-23. Ms. Reed's attorney also stated that" .... $10,000.00 to Dr. Reed. We didn't know what 
the value was." TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. II, p. 321, L. 17-18. 
In his APPELLA"l\JT' S BRIEF, Dr. Reed stated that the only testimony by Ms. Reed 
concerning the Pinehurst lot was located at TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol 1, p. 237, L. 1-20. On page 
27 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. Reed cites the 
Court's attention to the same section of the Trial Transcript. Contrary to the claim made on page 27 
of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL. Ms. Reed did not give 
her opinion as to the value of the Pinehurst lot. 
All of the testimony concerning the value of the Pinehurst lot should be contained in the 
above cited parts of the_Trial Transcript and neither of the parties testified that the lot was worth 
$15,200.00. The only testimony as to the value of the lot was Dr. Reed's testimony and he stated 
that the lot was worth $10,000.00. 
On the top of page 27 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLAl'JT'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL, Ms. Reed claims that Court's Exhibit 1 was admitted by stipulation and claims that this 
stipulation can be found at TRIAL TRANSCRIPT; Vol II, p. 293, L. 7-12. A copy of this page of 
the Trial Transcript is attached. Court's Exhibit 1 was not mentioned. Tue Exhibits which were 
offered and admitted by stipulation on this page may be generally identified as follows: 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 1 was a pay stub for Ms. Reed's check dated July 23, 2010. 
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Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 was Ms. Reed's resume. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 40, entitled "CONFIRMATION OF STATUS CHANGE" was dated 
October 14, 2010 and documented Ms. Reed's job change as of October 10, 2010. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 42 was a Personal Payroll Authorization effective 12/5/10 for Ms. Reed 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 43 was a statement concerni._'lg the amount of gross earnings Ms. Reed 
would earn if she worked 24 hours a week. 
Plaintiff's Exhibit 44 was a calendar showing Ms. Reed's work schedule. 
Defendant's Exhibit L was a letter dated October 5, 2010 , from Ms. Reed to someone named 
Lori requesting a reduction in her work hours. 
To summarize, there is no testimony in the record which establishes that the Pinehurst lot was 
worth $15,200.00. The only testimony in the record with respect to the value of the Pinehurst lot is 
discussed above and this evidence establishes that the Pinehurst lot was worth $10,000.00. Court's 
Exhibit 1 was never admitted and Ms. Reed has failed to show any part of the record which 
establishes otherwise. 
On page 28, of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, 
Ms. Reed contends that Dr Reed was attempting to mislead this Court by not citing the entire 
exchange quoted on page 28 of her Brief. This claim is false. Dr. Reed, and Ms. Graham, on behalf 
of Ms. Reed, stipulated that the value of the lot was $10,000.00. The additional part of the record 
quoted by Ms. Reed in her RESPONDENT'S REPLY BRIEF ON APPEAL only establishes that Dr. 
Reed did not want to enter into a second stipulation that the lot should be awarded to him. 
On the bottom of page 28 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL, Ms. Reed contends that the Court relied on the ta,x assessment and testimony of the 
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Respondent in arriving at the lot value of $15,200.00. The tax assessment was never admitted at 
trial and ifit was, Ms. Reed has failed to comply with I.A.R. 35 (b) (6) by failing to state where in 
the record the tax assessment was admitted. Ms. Reed never stated that the lot was worth $15,200.00 
and has not stated where in the record this testimony is located as would be required by I.A.R.35 (b) 
(6). 
On the bottom of page 28 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL, Ms. Reed claims that Dr. Reed testified to a lower value than what the lot was wortJ1. The 
record does not support this statement. No evidence was admitted at trial which established that the 
Pinehurst lot was worth more than $10,000.00. When Dr. Reed stated that the lot was worth 
$10,000.00, Ms. Reed's attorney stipulated to this value and stated that "We didn't know what the 
value was." TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. 2, p. 321, L. 17-18. Had the lot been worth more than 
$10,000.00, it is somewhat surprising that Ms. Reed did not request that it be awarded to her for 
$10,000.00. 
On the top of page 29 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL, Ms. Reed makes a number of other assertions concerning Dr. Reed without citing the 
Court to those portions of the record which substantiate her claims. Again, she has not complied 
with I.A.R.35 (b) (6) and these claims should be disregarded. 
The Court exercises free review over questions oflaw. Sims above. Dr. Reed testified that 
the lot was worth $10,000.00. This value was accepted by Ms. Reed's attorney who added that they 
did not know what the value was. TRIAL TRANSCRIPT: Vol. II, p. 321, L. 17-18. Irrespective of 
whether or not Dr. Reed stipulated to the award of the Pinehurst lot to him, both he and Ms. Reed's 
attorney stipulated that the lot was worth $10,000.00. An admission made by an attorney at trial is 
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binding on his or her client as a solemn admission. McClean v. City of Spirit Lake, 91 Idaho 779, 
783,430 P. 2d 670,674 (1967). 
A complete copy of Judge Griffin's Memorandum Opinion on Appeal was attached to Dr. 
Reed's Motion to Augment dated November 26, 2013, On the bottom of page 8 of his 
Memorandum Opinion, Judge Griffin affirmed Judge Wayman, with the exception of the QDRO 
distribution date, and concluded as to the other issues that, "The Magistrate reached his decision on 
all other issues through reason and acted within the bounds of bis discretion. There was substantial 
and competent evidence to support those findings and conclusions." Unfortunately, Judge Griffin 
did not state what part of the record he had reviewed which established that Court's Exhibit l had 
been admitted or that the Pinehurst commercial lot was worth $15,200.00. 
Where the trial court's findings are not based upon substantial and competent evidence, they 
must be set aside. Wood v. Sadler, 93 Idaho 552,557,468 P. 2d 42,47 (1970). The dollar amount 
of the total award to Dr. Reed should have been reduced by $5,200.00 with an appropriate reduction 
in the amount of the equalizing judgment. Because substantial and competent evidence did not 
support Judge Wayman's value of $15,200.00, Judge Griffin erred in affirming this value. Judge 
Griffin's decision to affirm Judge Wayman should be reversed and the matter remanded back for 
further proceedings. 
III 
DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIRMING J1.JDGE WA YMAN'S DECISION 
CONCER.i"I\J"ING MS. REED'S GROSS INCOME FOR PURPOSES OF SETTING A CHILD 
SUPPORT A.MOUNT 
On pages 30 and 31 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
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APPEAL, Ms. Reed lists a number of reasons why she claims she decided to go from a 3 6 hour 
work week to a 24 hour work week. The court, however, is required to impute full time income 
to a voluntarily underemployed parent unless that parent is caring for a child less than 6 months of 
age. I.R.C.P.6 (c) (6), Section 6(c)(l). The Court may depart from the Guidelines only ifit finds 
that the evidence establishes that the amount of child support required by the guidelines would be 
inappropriate and sets forth on the record the dollar amount that the Guidelines would require and 
the circumstances justifying a departure from the Guidelines. I.R.C.P. 6 (c) (6), Section 3. Judge 
Wayman did not make these required factual findings in order to establish a factual basis to justify 
a departure from the Guidelines. 
Not only did Judge Wayman fail to make any findings justifying his departure from the 
Guidelines, he stated he was going to impute income to Ms. Reed to her" ... as if she was working 
full-time." TRAL'-JSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 32, L. 16-18. This statement by 
Judge Wayman contradicts Ms. Reed's statement on the bottom of page 30 of her RESPONDENT'S 
REPLY TO APPELL.L\...c"-JT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL that " ... he did not state that he was going to 
impute her full wage to her." 
As she has done throughout her Brief, on pages 30 and 31 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY 
TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. Reed makes numerous derogatory statements about 
Dr. Reed without citing this Court to any part of the record which supports her statements as she is 
required to do by I.A.R.35(b )( 6) . Not only has she failed to cite the Court to those portions of the 
record which support her statements, she has disregarded Judge Wayman's statements about Dr. 
Reed when he announced his decision. Some of his statements were as follows: 
"Both parents have good suggestions. There is merit to both of your suggestions. And I find 
that both of you genuinely believe that the suggested parenting plan is in your child's best interest. 
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And that is a huge positive factor for these children, because I have two parents who care about them 
so much that they're willing to come to court and fight over what they think is right for their 
children. And you have your children's best interests at heart. This isn't a situation where one 
parent or the other is saying, I need to do this for me. I think that both parents are saying, I think this 
is genuinely in my children's best interest and that's where I'm-that's why I'm putting forth my 
request." TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing: p. 9, L. 9-21. 
" ... But what I can infer from all of the testimony and from the reports that I have reviewed 
is that these children want to be with both parents. And I can also infer that they want to be happy." 
TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing. p. 10, L. 1-5. 
"And here I've got, again, two good parents who have been involved with these children 
their entire lives. This is not an absent parent situation. This is not a situation where one parent 
went off and did all the work and didn't interact with his children and the other parent stayed home 
and raised them to the exclusion of the other parent. We have both parents who have been involved 
with these children. And as I mentioned a moment ago, all three children seem to be doing well for 
the most part, as they've gone through this situation." TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision 
Hearing. p. 10, L. 5-24. 
"So, again, this is another positive factor that there are healthy relationship between the 
children and each other and the children and their parent." TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision 
Hearing, p. 11, L. 17-10. 
On the top of page 32 of her RESPO1'lTIENT'S REPLY TO APPELLA.~T'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL, it is stated that "Additionally, Respondent testified that she was not able to work full-time 
as Appellant's Counsel argues, the most that the hospital shall allow is 36 hours per week and that 
is after establishment of seniority." Dr. Reed has not contended in this appeal that the Court should 
have imputed income to Ms. Reed as though she was working 40 hours per week. He does claim 
that where the evidence established that less than three months before trial, Ms. Reed had been 
working 36 hours per week and had voluntarily cut her hours back to 24 hours a week, Judge 
Wayman erred when he failed to impute income to Ms. Reed based on a 36 hour work week. TRIAL 
TRANSCRIPT: Vol Il, p. 291, L. 2-12. 
On appeal to the District Court, in his Memorandum Decision, Judge Griffin, affirmed Judge 
Wayman with respect to the amount of child support but stated in his Memorandum Opinion that 
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'"..In orally announcing his decision the Magistrate seemed to indicate that Stephanie, at the time of 
trial, was only working 24 homs every two weeks instead of 24 hours per week. The Magistrate 
therefore doubled his estimate of Stephanie's current income ($20,514.00 per year) to arrive at the 
final i11come figure of$41,028.00 per year. It appears from Exhibit #43 that Stephanie was, at the 
time of trial, actually working every weekend and earning approximately $41,028.00 per year." (R. 
Vol. 5, bottom of page 1217 and top of page 1218). He also stated, in part, that "The court 
considered a work schedule that permitted Stephanie to continue to meet responsibilities for caring 
for the parties' children during the week." R. Vol 5,p. 1217. 
Judge Wayman'serrorwas a math error. Judge Griffin found thatJudge Wayman had made 
an error, but affirmed Judge Wayman's decision on a basis that is not entirely clear. It appears that 
Judge Griffin felt that Judge Wayman could depart from the Guidelines because of the custody 
arrangement which required Ms. Reed to care for the three children. Judge Wayman, however, 
expressly stated that under the Guidelines he was required to impute income to Ms. Reed. 
"-...f.R.C.P.6(c)(6) Section 3. Function of Guidelines states in part that " ... The amount 
resulting from the application of Guidelines, which includes the basic child support calculation and 
all adjustments, is the amount of child support to be awarded unless evidence establishes that amount 
to be inappropriate. In such case, the coTu'i: shall set forth on the record the dollar amount of support 
that the Guidelines would require and set forth the circumstances justifying departure from the 
Guidelines." Judge Wayman did not ma,\e these findings because he did not intend to depart from 
the Guidelines in setting the support amount. 
"The relevant inquiry in determining an abuse of discretion is whether or not the trial court; 
(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion; (2) acted within the outer boundaries of its 
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discretion and consistently with the legal standards applicable to the choices before it; and (3) 
reached its decision by an exercise of reason." Barrett v. Barrett, 149 Idaho 21, 23, 232 P. 3d 
799,801 (2010). 
If Judge Wayman intended to depart from the Guidelines, he abused his discretion when he 
failed to " .. set forth on the record the dollar amount of support that the Guidelines would require and 
set forth the circumstances justifying the departure from the Guidelines .... " as was and is required 
by I.R.C.P.6 (c)(6), Section 3. When Judge Griffin affirmed Judge Wayman, he abused his 
discretion by affirming a decision which was the product of a math error even though he knew that 
Judge Wayman and made the math error. Alternatively, he abused his discretion by affirming a 
departure from the Guidelines with respect to Ms. Reed's potential income where Judge Wayman 
had not made the findings he was required to make if he departed from the Guidelines as are 
required under I.R.C.P.6 (c)(6), Section 3. 
IV 
WAS IT ERROR FOR JUDGE WAYMAN TO A WARD ATTORNEY FEES TO MS. 
REED AND DID filDGE GRJFFIN ERR IN AFFIRl\1ING THIS AW ARD 
A. FAIL URE TO TIMELY FILE: 
On January 28, 2011, Judge Waymai---i orally awarded Ms. Reed a judgment in the amount of 
$10,000.00 for a partial award ofher attorney fees and costs. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision 
Hearing, p. 74, L. 9-25. On February 24, 2011, a written judgment for attorney fees was entered. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 96-97. On April 7, 2011, a copy of the transcript of the Court's oral decision hearing 
was attached to a two page cover sheet entitled "FINDINGS OFF ACT, CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
At"JD FINAL DECREE OF DIVORCE R. Vol. 1, p. 104-186. On June 20, 2011, an A.mended 
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Final Decree of Divorce was filed. R. Vol. 1, p. 208-229. Ms. Reed did not file a Memorandum of 
Fees and Costs until November 21, 2011. R. Vol. 3, p. 570-641, and well over 14 days after the entry 
of any of the above. 
In Harney v. Weatherby, 116 Idaho 904, 781 P. 2d 241 (Ct. App. 1989), the magistrate 
filed a written decision on April 16, 1987, wherein he determined that Weatherby was entitled to an 
award of fees under I.C.32-704(2). Fifty five days later on July 14, 1987, a memorandum of costs 
was filed on behalf of Weatherby. The Idaho Court of Appeals held that by failing to file his 
memorandum of costs within 14 days of April 16, 1987, when the written decision had been entered, 
Weatherby had waived his right to seek an award of fees. In a footnote, the Idaho Court of Appeals 
noted that the 14 day time limit could be extended, but there was no indication in the record that a 
request was ever made to extend the time to file a memorandum of costs and that "Without the grant 
of a discretionary extension, the fourteen-day requirement under the rule was self-executing." 
In Harney, the Idaho Court of Appeals held that the question of compliance with the rules 
of procedure relating to the award of attorney fees was an issue of law upon which the Idaho Court 
of Appeals could exercise free review. (At pages 906 and 907 Idaho). The holding in Harney was 
cited with approval in Medrano v. Neibaur, 136 Idaho 767, 40 P. 3d 125,127 (2002), wherein the 
Idaho Supreme Court stated at page 769, Idaho, that " ... Harney cited by Nebbaur, is on point 
regarding the denial of attorney fees for the untimely submission of the memorandum of costs and 
attorney fees although Harney addresses attorney fees awarded under I.C.32-704 (2). However, the 
underlying issues are the same-a prevailing party was awarded attorney fees, but waited until the 
deadline had long passed before submitting a memorandu..rn. of costs and attorney fees." 
In his APPELLANT'S BRlEF before the District Court, Dr. Reed asserted that it was error 
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for Judge Wayman to award fees where Ms. Reed's memorandum of fees and costs was not filed 
within 14 days of the date of the entry of the judgments in the case. R. Vol. 3, p. 757-759. The same 
argument was also made in Dr. Reed's APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON SECOND APPEAL. R. Vol. 
5, p. 1131-1134. Judge Griffin discussed Judge Wayman's award of attorney fees on page 3 of his 
MEMORANDUM OPINION dated April 5, 2013. R. Vol. 5,p. 1215. While Judge Griffin affirmed 
Judge Wayman's award of fees, he did not specifically address Dr. Reed's argument that by failing 
to file a memorandum of fees and costs within 14 days of the date of the entry of judgment as is 
required by I.R.C.P.54 ( d) (5), Ms. Reed had waived her right to seek an award of attorney fees and 
costs. 
Ms. Reed discusses this issue on page 33 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO 
APPELLi\NT' S BRIEF ON APPEAL In the one paragraph she devotes to this issue on this page, 
she has failed to cite any Idaho rule of procedure, case or statute in support of her claim that the 
above error was cured because Judge Wayman required her to file a Memorandum of Fees and Cost 
after he had set aside the first award. In the last sentence of this paragraph she discusses the 
" ... Appellant's defiant and obstructionist conduct during the Trial." It is undear how this alleged 
conduct would provide an excuse under the Idaho Rules of Civil Procedure for Ms. Reed's failure 
to file a timely memorandum of fees and costs. As with other factual claims made in her Brief, she 
has failed to comply with I.A.R.35 (b) (6) by failing to cite this Court's attention to the parts of the 
transcript and record reiied upon for this statement, 
Because Ms. Reed did not file a timely fee request as required by I.R.C.P.54 (d) (5), Judge 
Wayman erred as a matter of law in awarding her fees. Judge Griffin also erred as a matter of law 
in affirming this award. The judgment for attorney fees should be set aside and Ms. Reed should be 
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directed to pay Dr. Reed the $10,100.00 he paid in to the Court to avoid execution as is established 
by his Notice of Tender which was filed on July 9, 2012. R. Vol. 4, p.960-964. 
B. FAIL URE TO CITE I.C. 32-704 IN HER FEE REQUEST: 
On the bottom of page 33 and the top of page 34 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO 
.t\PPELLAl'-TT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. Reed lists what she claims would be the authority for 
an award of fees by Judge Wayman. The Memorandum of Attorney Fees and Costs (R. Vol. 3, 
p.570-641) filed by Ms. Reed's attorney did not cite either I.C.32-704 or I.C.32-705 as the basis for 
the request for fees and costs. In KEB ENTERPRISES, L.P. v. Smedley, 140 Idaho 746, 754, 
101 P. 3d 690,698 (2004), , the Idaho Supreme Court held that "In order to be awarded attorney fees, 
a party must actually assert the statute or other basis for the award." fa Bingham v. Montane 
Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420,424, 987 P. 2d 1035,1039 (1999), the Idaho Supreme Court 
held, in part, at page 424 Idaho, that the District Court was not empowered to award fees on a basis 
not asserted by the moving party. 
Because the Memorandum of Fees and Costs filed by Ms. Reed did not cite either I.C.32-
704 or I.C.32-705 as the basis for the request for an award of fees in favor of Ms. Reed, Judge 
Wayman erred as a matter oflaw in awarding Ms. Reed fees under either of these two statutes when 
they were not stated to be the basis for the request for an award of fees in her Memorandum of 
Attorney Fees and Costs. Judge Griffin erred as a matter oflaw in affirming the award. 
C: THE FACTS INTRODUCED AT TRIAL DO NOT SUPPORT AN AW ARD OF ATTORL~'EY 
FEES UNDER I.C.32-704 and I.C.32-705 
On page 34, in the last full paragraph of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF OF APPEAL, Ms. Reed contends that "The Appellant's reliance upon the old case of Jensen 
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v. Jensen, 128 Idaho 600,917 P. 2d 757 which is a 1996 case is wrong ..... " If so, this error was also 
made by Judge Waymai.1 when he cited Jensen v. Jensen, 128 Idaho 600, 917 P. 2d 757 (1996) in 
support of his decision to award Ms. Reed attorney fees and stated that a disparity in incomes is 
generally sufficient to justify an award of attorney fees under I.C.32-704 (3), although an award 
might not be appropriate when a party has the financial resources necessary to prosecute or def end 
the action. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing, p. 72, L. 6-14. 
On page 32 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPL YTO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. 
Reed cites Antill v. Antill, 127 Idaho 954, 908 P. 2d 1261 (Ct App. 1996). In Antill, the Court of 
Appeals stated at page 959 Idaho that "Where a discretionary decision is tainted by a legal or factual 
error, the appropriate response is to remand the case to the trial court for a proper exercise of 
discretion." Judge Wayman made a factual error when he found that Ms. Reed's income was about 
$20,000.00 per year when he was announcing his initial decision concerning the award of attorney 
fees. TRANSCRIPT: Court's Oral Decision Hearing. p.69,L. 16-17. Judge Griffin, after looking 
at the same evidence Judge Wayman had looked at, concluded that based on his review of the 
evidence, Ms. Reed was earning $41,028.00 a year, not $20,000.00 a year. (R. Vol. 5, at the bottom 
of p. 121 7 and the top of p. 1218), Under the statement in Antill, this significant factual error 
should have resulted in a decision by Judge Griffin to reverse the award of attorney fees in favor of 
Ms. Reed and to remand the case back to Judge Wayman for a reconsideration of the attorney fee 
award in light of the actual income made by Ms. Reed. This he failed to do. 
As an aside, in the last full paragraph on page 35 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO 
APPELLA}JT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. Reed states that the attorney fee award was a " ... flat fee 
award under I.C.32-704 (3)." Nothing in the record supports this claim and Ms. Reed has failed to 
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direct this Court to any part of the record which supports this claim. 
Judge Wayman erred as a matter of law when he awarded Ms. Reed her attorney fees and 
costs even though her Memorandum of Fees and Costs was not filed on time and even though Ms. 
Reed had failed to cite either I.C.32-704 or I.C.32-705 in her Memorandum of Fees and Costs. 
Judge Griffin erred as a matter of law in affirming this award. 
Judge Wayman's finding that Ms. Reed was only making $20,000.00 a year when he was 
discussing the award of attorney fees to Ms. Reed was not based on substantial and competent 
evidence. Judge Griffin erred as a matter oflaw when he failed to reverse the attorney fee award and 
remand the case back to Judge Wayman for reconsideration of the attorney fee award using the 
correct income figure for Ms. Reed. 
V 
WAS IT ERROR FOR JUDGE WAYMAN TO ORDER THE TWO CORPORA TIO NS TO 
ISSUE STOCK AND DELIVER THE STOCK TO THE SHOSHONE COUNTY SHERIFF AND 
DID JUDGE GRIFFIN ERR IN AFFIRMING THIS DECISION 
A copy of the relevant Writ of Execution, which will be discussed below, can be found at R. 
Vol. 1, p. 234-235. 
On page 36 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. 
Reed agrees that I.R.C.P.69 prohibits the issuance of a writ of execution from a partial judgment. 
She then states that Rule 69 does not prohibit a writ from being issued on a partial judgment which 
is the result of an adjudication of all claims in the case. She does not cite any authority for this claim. 
On the bottom of page 37 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON 
APPEAL she states that "The judgments at issue are simply not partial judgments which execution 
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would be premature and barred by I.R.C.P.69." She is incorrect. 
A. JlJDGMENT FOR ATTORNEY FEES: 
Dr, Reed has not argued in this present appeal that the judgment for attorney fees was not 
a final judgment wl1ich would support a writ of execution. He claims that the attorney fee judgment 
was not valid because his due process rights were violated when it was entered without giving him 
notice and the opportunity to be heard. Garren v. Roms, 85 Idaho 86, 375 P. 2d 994 (1962). 
(APPELLANT'S BRIEF, p. 41). Judge Wayman agreed and at the hearing which was held on 
November 7, 2011, he found that the February 24, 2011, judgment for attorneys fees should not have 
been entered because Dr. Reed had not been given the opportunity to challenge the amount under 
Rule 54. TRAl\JSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearings, p. 94, L. 5-11. The attorney fee award was 
set aside by an order which was entered on November 15, 2011. R. Vol. 3, p. 567-569. While all 
of this transpired after the writ had been issued, had the attorney fee judgment been the only 
judgment upon which the writ was issued, under the holding in Garren, the writ would have been 
void. Ms. Reed has not advanced any cogent argument othenvise in her RESPONDENT'S REPLY 
TO APPELLAi'JT' S BRIEF ON APPEAL. 
B. FEBRUARY 24, 2011 EQUALIZING JUDGMENT: 
LR.C.P.69 REQU1RES A FINAL JUDGMENT TO SUPPORT A WRIT OF EXECUTION: 
I.R.C.P. 54 (a) states in part that "A judgment is final of it either has been certified as final 
pursuant to subsection (b) (1) of this rule or judgment has been entered on all claims for relief, 
except costs and attorney fees." 
I.R.C.P.69 (a) states in part as follows, "Process to enforce an appealable final judgment or 
partial judgment certified as final under Rule 54(b) for the payment of money, or a court order for 
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the payment of money shall be shall be by a writ of execution, unless the court directs otherwise, but 
no writ of execution may issue on a partial judgment which is not certified as final under Rule 54 
(b )." Ms. Reed argues on pages 36 and 37 of her RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S 
BRIEF ON APPEAL that because the February 24, 2011 equalizing judgment was entered after trial, 
it would support a writ of execution. She has cited no authority for this position other than to argue 
that this judgment was not a partial judgment because it was entered after Judge Wayman had heard 
the entire case and orally annow.7.ced his decision. She states, in part, on the bottom of page 36 of 
her Brief that "" ... Rule 69 does not prohibit a vvrit of execution from being issued from a judgment 
which is the result of an adjudication of all the claims pending in the case-but simply does not 
contain a Rule 54 (b) certificate." She is mistaken. 
A writ of execution can not be issued under I.R.C.P.69 unless the judgment is final or has 
been certified by the Court as being final with a certificate issued pursuant to I.R.C.P.54(b). In 
T.J.T,Inc v. Mori, 148 Idaho 825,826,203 P. 3d435 (2010) the districtcourthadgrantedsummary 
judgment and had entered an order stating that: "The Court hereby GRANTS Mori's motion for 
summary judgment and DENIES T.J.l.'s motion for partial S1.lIIh'llary judgment. IT IS SO 
ORDERED." The Idaho Supreme Court held that this was not a final judgment for purposes of 
appeal and stated on page 826 Idaho that "In Camp v. East Fork Ditch Co, this Court defined a final 
judgment as 'an order or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the 
controversy, and represents a final determination of the rights of the parties." 
In Bach v. Dawson, 152 Idaho 237,239, 268 P. 3d 1189, 1191 (Ct. App. 2012), the Idaho 
Court of Appeals stated at page 239, Idaho, that: 
"The term 'judgment' is not defined by the statutes at issue, so we look to the definitions of 
the term found in both Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (a) and Idaho case law. Rule 54 (a) defines 
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a judgment as a separate document without conclusions of fact or law, but merely stating the relief 
to which the party is entitled. It is a fmal judgment according to that rule, if it is either ( 1) entered 
as to all claims in the case or (2) if it is certified as final lDlder Idaho Rule of Civil Procedure 54 (b) 
as to some parties in a case, but not all of them. Similarly, our case law states that a 'judgment' is 
a final determination of the rights of the parties in an action.' (Cites omitted). 
In Watson v. Watson, 144 Idaho 214, 159 P. 3d 851 (2007), the district court entered a 
judgment on September 26, 2003, stating that both parties owned real property as tenants in common 
and requiring one party to provide an accounting. This judgment was thereafter referred to in the 
opinion as the"2003 judgment". On July 22, 2005, a second money judgment was entered for 
$8,299.25 against one of the parties, Duane. This was to be thereafter referred to as the "2005 
judgment." On August 17, 2005, Duane filed a notice of appeal stating that he was appealing the 
2005 judgment. 
As was stated by the Idaho Supreme Court, the first issue to be decided was whether or not 
Duane had brought a timely appeal from the "2003 judgment." The Idaho Supreme Court concluded 
that he had. On page 217, Idaho, the Court stated t.11at "As a general rule, a fmal judgment is an order 
or judgment that ends the lawsuit, adjudicates the subject matter of the controversy and represents 
a final determination of the parties' rights." Because the 2003 judgment did not end the lawsuit, the 
Idaho Supreme Court found that it was not a final determination of the parties' rights. The Idaho 
Supreme Court went on to state that the 2003 judgment was best characterized as an interlocutory 
judgment which required a Rule 54 (b) certificate in order to be appealable. 
Similarly, the February 24, 2011, money judgment to equalize the property distribution is best 
characterized as an interlocutory judgment. It contained no provisions for the distribution of the 
community property. It contained no allocation of the community debts. It did not address custody 
or child support. It did not dissolve the marriage of the parties. It did not fully adjudicate the 
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subject matter of the controversy nor did it end the lawsuit The only proper order which did all 
of these things was the Amended Final Decree of Divorce which was entered on June 20, 2011. R. 
Vol. 1, p. 208-229 . It required Ms. Reed to obtain separate civil judgments if she wanted to execute. 
R. Vol. 1, p. 218-219. I.R.C.P.69 did not authorize the issuance of a writ of execution on the 
equalizing judgment because it was not a "final judgment." 
Additional steps beyond filing a proposed judgment with the Court are also required in a 
divorce matter involving children. I.R.C.P.58(a) states that the entry of judgment shall not be made 
in a divorce action until the prevailing party furnishes to the clerk a completed certificate of divorce. 
This rule further states that the entry of judgment shall not be made as to any decree that contains 
the obligation for child support unless it is accompanied by t..he completed transmittal form to be sent 
to the Department of Health and Welfare. These requirements, which are unique to a divorce 
involving children, further demonstrate that the nJDGMENT FOR EQUALIZATION OF 
PROPERTY SETTLE1\IIBNT was not a final judgment. 
C. JUNE 2011 Al\tfENDED FINAL DIVORCE DECREE 
On page 38 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLAt"'l'T'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. 
Reed disputes Dr. Reed's claim that the two February judgments merged into the June 20, 2011, 
Amended Final Decree of Divorce. The Amended Final Decree of Divorce included the judgment 
to equalize the property distribution and the judgment for attorney fees. R. Vol. 1, p. 218-219. If 
the Amended Final Decree of Divorce did not supersede the earlier February judgments, then as of 
June 20, 2011, there would have been two judgments for attorney fees and two judgments to equalize 
the property distribution. 
As was discussed on page 40 of the APPELLANT'S BRIEF, on September 16, 2011, Dr. 
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Reed filed an Objection to Ms. Reed's motion seeking an order from the Court directing the 
corporations to issue stock and deliver the stock to the Sheriffs Department. (R. Vol. 2, p. 
380-389). As was also stated on page 40 of the APPELLANT'S BRIEF, the hearing was held on 
September 28, 2011, and the transcript of the hearing reflects that Dr. Reed, through counsel, 
advised the Court the writ was invalid because it not issued from valid judgments. TR.At"'JSCRIPT: 
Various Motions Hearing, p. 59--61. Judge Wayman, however, found otherwise and stated that 
both of the money judgments entered on February 24, 2011 were final judgments and directed the 
corporations to issue Dr. Reed's stock shares and deliver the shares to the Shoshone County Sheriffs 
Department. TRANSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearing, p. 65-66. 
On September 30, 2011, an Order was entered which required the corporations to issue the 
stock shares and deliver them to the Shoshone County Sheriffs Department. R. Vol. 2, p. 422-423. 
This order further stated that the shares would be held until after the hearing on Dr. Reed's Amended 
Motion for Reconsideration and Amendment of Findings of the Court, and, thereafter, " ... the Sheriff 
of Shoshone County shall proceed forward with an execution upon the above referenced stock as 
commanded by the Writ of Execution which was issued by this Court on July 12, 2011.. .. " On 
October 25, 2011, an AMENDED NOTICE OF A.PPEAL was filed and one of the orders discussed 
in the AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL was the September 30, 2011 order. (R. Vol. 2, p. 491, sub 
paragraph (g)). 
Based on the authorities cited above, it is submitted that Judge Wayman erred as a matter of 
law in concluding that the TIJDGMENT FOR EQUALIZATION OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENT 
was a final judgment upon which a vvTit of execution could issue. If so, Judge Griffin erred as a 
matter of law in affirming him. 
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D. I.C.8-506C 
On page 39 ofher RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLAL'-l"T'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, Ms. 
Reed has tvvo headings concerning I.C.8-506 C and I.C.28-8-102. In the first paragraph under the 
heading, she discusses the February 24, 2011, attorney fee judgment and the February 24, 2011, 
JUDGMENT FOR EQUALIZATION OF PROPERTY SETTLEMENT. She thereafter claims that 
"The Appellant has made no efforts to try and make any form of payments to satisfy these 
judgments." With respect to the award of attorney fees, she is incorrect. 
As was discussed above, the February 24, 2011 attorney fee judgment was set aside. Another 
attorney fee judgment was entered on June 8, 2012. R. Vol. 4, p. 876-878. On July 19, 2012, Dr. 
Reed tendered into the Court $10,100.00 pursuant to the provisions ofl.C.10-1115 to satisfy this 
particular judgment .. Vol. 4, p. 960-963. Ms. Reed filed a motion with the Court asking that these 
funds be paid to her on August 9, 2012. It appears at this time that the motion is missing from the 
Clerk's present record but it is referenced in the Index located at R. Vol. 4, p 787. The order was 
also missing from the original record but a certified copy was attached to the ST A TEMENT AND 
MOTION TO AUGMENT RECORD filed with this Court on December 2, 2013. The Supreme 
Court granted the Motion to Augment on December 6, 2013. 
On the bottom of page 40, Ms. Reed cites I.C.8-506. At the top of page 41, she quotes this 
code section. This code section is part of several statutes which pertain to \¾Tits of attachment, not 
writs of execution. Writs of execution are discussed in I.C.11-101 et. seq. 
I.C.8-501 authorizes a plaintiff to attach property as security for the satisfaction of any 
judgment which might be entered. I.C.8-504 specifically addresses writs of attachment. I.C.8-505 
describes the property which may be attached and I.C.8-506 states how certain types of property 
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interests are to be attached by a writ of attachment. The last sentence of I.C.8-504 states that several 
writs of attachment may be issued at the same time. I.C.1-1616 (1) requires the Court's seal to be 
affixed to a writ of attachment. Writs of attachment are, therefore, to be issued by the Court, not 
the Sheriff's Department. 
Dr. Reed's shares in Mountain Health Care., Inc., were supposedly attached by A NOTICE 
OF GARNISHMENT/NOTICE OF ATTACHMENT & LEVY UPON STOCK SHARES OF 
STOCK OR INTEREST IN SHARES OF STOCK OF MOUNTAIN HEALTH CARE INC. This 
was issued by the Shoshone County Sheriff's Office and signed by an officer of the Shoshone 
County Sheriff's Department. The document itself was prepared by one of Ms. Reed's attorneys. 
A copy of this attachment is located at R. Vol. 2, p. 328-329. According to this document, Dr. 
Reed's shares in Mountain Health Care, Inc, were being attached pursuant to the invalid Writ of 
Execution discussed above. This attachment was void and of no force nor effect because it was not 
based on a valid writ of execution and because it was not done pursuant to a writ of attachment 
signed by the District Court Clerk. 
A second NOTICE OF GARNISHMENT/NOTICE OF ATTACHMENT & LEVY UPON 
STOCK SHA.RES OF STOCK OR INTEREST IN STOCK OF MOUNT A.IN HEAL TH SERVICES, 
P. C. was issued by the Shoshone County Sheriff's Otnce. This document was also prepared by one 
of Ms. Reed's attorneys. The Notice was directed to Mountain Health Services, P.C. but the body 
of the document refers to Mountain Health Care, Inc. R. Vol. 2, p. 332-334. According to this 
document, the shares were also being attached pursuant to the invalid Writ of Execution discussed 
above. This attachment was void and of no force nor effect because it was not based on a valid writ 
of execution and because it was not done pursuant to a writ of attachment signed by the District 
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Court Clerk. 
When Judge Wayman ruled that both corporations should issue the stock shares and turn 
them over to the Sheriff's Department, he did so pursuant to the provisions of I.C.8-516. 
TRANSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearing, p. 62, L. 13-25, p. 63, p. 64, L. 1-5. This code section 
presupposes that a valid writ has been given to the Sheriff, that a legitimate attempt to garnish the 
property of the judgment creditor has taken place and that a Court order is necessary to get the third 
party to release the debtor's property in :ris hands to the Sheriff. Because the Writ was invalid, the 
later steps to use the Writ to collect on the judgment were ineffectual. Judge Wayman erred as a 
matter oflaw in concluding that the Writ was valid and thereafter ordering the corporations to issue 
the stock and turn the shares over to the Sheriffs Office pursuant to the provisions of I.C.8-516. 
Judge Griffin erred as a matter of law in affirming Judge Wayman. 
E. I.C.28-8-112(5) 
On pages 42-43, Ms. Reed discusses I.C.28-8-112(5) and on page 43 claims that this code 
section authorizes not only the seizure of stock but also the sale of stock to satisfy the two judgments 
discussed above. This code section does not authorize shares to be sold and would not have 
authorized Judge Wayman to order the shares to be sold by the Shoshone County Sheriff's 
Department. The shares would have had to have been sold at an execution sale and this would have 
required a valid writ of execution. I.C.11-104. 
When he ordered the corporations to issue the shares and deliver them to the Shoshone 
County Sheriff's Department, Judge Wayman did not discuss I.C.28-8-112(5} as the authority for 
his decision. The only statute he cited was I.C.8-516 (TRANSCRIPT: Various Motions Hearings, 
p. 62, L.6-25, p, 63, L. 1-9). Because he did not decide that I.C.28-8-112(5) authorized him to order 
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the corporations to issue t.11e stock and deliver the shares to the Sheriff's Department for sale, this 
code section is not relevant to the issues to be decided on appeal. 
On page 7 of his Memorandum Decision ( attached to the Motion to Augment Record filed 
with this Court on November 29, 2013) Judge Griffin did not find that Judge Wayman's decision 
was supported by I.C.28-8-112(5). The only authority he cited for his ruling in regards to the above 
issue was I.R.C.P.70. This rule authorizes the court to appoint someone else to sign transfer 
documents where a party has been ordered to do so but refuses. This rule was not applicable because 
Dr. Reed was never ordered to issue the stock certificates and sign the stock certificates over to Ms. 
Reed. The two corporations had the authority to issue the certificates and I.R.C.P.70 had no 
application to them because they were not parties. 
I.C.28-8-112(5) authorizes the court to issue an injunction concerning the stock shares. On 
July 25, 2011, Ms. Reed obtained an order from the court prohibiting Dr. Reed from transferring the 
shares. R. Vol. 2, p. 258-259. The last sentence of this code section also authorizes the court to take 
other unspecified action if the certificates." ..... cannot be reached by other legal process." Since Ms. 
Reed had already been successful in enjoining Dr. Reed from transferring the shares, the shares could 
still be reached by other legal process. 
For the reasons discussed above, Judge Wayman erred as a matter oflaw in ruling that he 
could order the corporations to issue the shares and deliver them to the Shoshone County Sheriff's 
Department for sale. Judge Griffin erred as a matter of law in affirming this decision. 
RESPONDENT'S ADDITIONAL ISSUE ON APPEAL 
VI 
VI. THAT THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AWARDED HERATTORNEYFEES AND 
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COST ON A.PPEAL PURSUANT TO IAR 41 AND I.C.12-121 AS PREVAILING PARTY 
A. MS. REED FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE RULES APPLICABLE TO AN 
AW ARD OF ATTORNEY FEES IN EITHER THE DISTRICT COlJRT APPEAL OR IN THIS 
APPEAL AND HER REQUEST SHOULD BE DENIED. 
On May 22, 2013, Ms. Reed filed a Notice of Cross Appeal. R. Vol. 5, p. 1237-1240. In her 
cross appeal, she asked this Court to review Judge Griffin's denial of her request for an award of 
attorney fees incurred in the appeal before the District Court. On pages 43-44 of her 
RESPONDENT'S REPLY TO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL dated February 11, 2014, she 
lists as her issue VI that "THE RESPONDENT SHOULD BE AW ARD ED HER ATTORt"\IEY' S 
FEES M'D COSTS ON APPEAL PURSUAL'-.JT TO IAR41 A.ND I.C.12-121 AS PREVAILING 
P A..T{TY." It is unclear from this statement whether she is claiming as an issue on appeal that Judge 
Griffin erred in denying her request for attorney fees and costs incurred by her in the two district 
court appeals, or whether she is seeking an award of attorney fees and costs incurred in this appeal 
to the Idaho Supreme Court, or both. 
This is not clarified by her argument which follows the above quoted heading. On the bottom 
of page 43 of her Brief, and without any citation to any part of the record, she accuses Dr. Reed of 
being obstructionist in trial and failing to fill out property lists, vvriting the opposite of what Ms. 
Reed wrote on the lists, or both. On page 44 of her Brief, she make further claims concerning 
alleged actions on the part Dr. Reed without any citation to any part of the record to support her 
claims. These claims appear to be premised on actions which took place before the appeal from the 
District Court was taken to the Idaho Supreme Court and some appear to be based on claimed actions 
of Dr. Reed which would have taken place before trial. 
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While Ms. Reed cites I.C.12-121 and I.A.R. 41 on page 43 in the argument portion of her 
Brief concerning the award of fees, the only case she cites as authority for her fee request is Rendon 
v. Paskett, 126 Idaho 944,945,894 P. 2d 775,776 (Ct. App. 1995). In Rendon, an inmate filed a 
petition for habeas corpus which the magistrate dismissed without a hearing. On appeal, the district 
court judge reversed the magistrate's dismissal and granted the petition. The district court judge, 
however, denied the inmate's request for an award of attorney fees and costs. The Idaho Court of 
Appeals affirmed the district court's denial of fees and stated that the record did not establish that 
the State had defended the habeas corpus petition frivolously or that the district court had abused it's 
discretion in denying the fee request. This case does not appear to support Ms. Reed's fee request. 
I.A.R.35 (b) (6) states that the argument in the Respondent's Brief " .... shall contain the 
contentions of the respondent with respect to the issues presented on appeal, the reasons therefore, 
with citations to the authorities, statutes and parts of the transcript and record relied upon." With 
respect to the similar rule applicable to Appellants' Briefs, I.A.R35.(a) (6), the Idaho Supreme 
Court held in Woods v. Crouse, 101 Idaho 764,765,620 P. 2d 798,799 (1980), that the Idaho 
Supreme Court will not presume error and will not search the record for error. The burden of 
showing error is on the party alleging it. 
If Ms. Reed is contending that this Court should reverse the district court's denial of her 
request for an award of attorney fees and costs, this should be denied as she has failed comply with 
I.A.R.35 (b )(6). If Ms. Reed is seeking an award of attorney fees in this present appeal, her request 
should be denied as she has failed to present an argument for fees in compliance with I.A.R.35 
(b )(6). Her claim should also be denied because she has failed to clearly state that she is seeking 
fees in this appeal as opposed to seeking a reversal of Judge Griffin's failure to award fees. She 
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has waived fees under the provisions of I.A.R.41 (1) (a). 
B. JUDGE GRIFFIN'S DECISION TO DENY MS. REED'S ATTORNEY FEE REQUEST 
lN THE DISTRICT COURT PROCEEDJNGS SHOlJLD BE AFFIRMED 
Ms. Reed was not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs for the proceedings before 
the district court. In her first Brief filed in the appeal before the district court on May 30, 2012, 
entitled her RESPON'DENT'S REPL YTO APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON APPEAL, (R. Vol.5,p. 834-
871), Ms. Reed neither asked for fees nor cited a statutory basis for any award of fees. Under 
I.A.R.41 (a), " .... Any party seeking fees on appeal must assert such claim as an issue presented on 
appeal in the first appellate brief filed by such party ..... ". I.A.R.35 (b)(5) states that a respondent 
must add a request for attorney fees as an additional issue on appeal and must state the basis for the 
fee request in the respondent's brief. Because Ms. Reed failed to make any argument or cite any 
authority for an award of fees in her brief in the first appeal, she waived them. Bingham v. 
Montane Resource Associates, 133 Idaho 420, 427, 987 P. 2d 1035 (1999). 
As one issue in his second appeal to the District Court, Dr, Reed contended that Judge 
Wayman erred in entering orders which divided the funds held in Dr. Reed's retirement plans as of 
June of 2011, instead of the date of the divorce on January 14, 2011. This issue was discussed on 
pages 22-24 of his APPELLANT'S BRIEF ON SECOND APPEAL (R. Vol. 5, p. 1138-1140). On 
page 6 of his MEMORANDUM OPINION, Judge Griffin agreed and stated that the court had 
granted a decree of divorce as of January 14, 2011 and that the Qualified Domestic Relations Order 
should be corrected to reflect this date. R. Vol. 5, p. 1218. On page 8 of his Memorandum Opinion 
(R. Vol. 5, p. 1219) he stated that "It appears that the QDROs were calculated as of the date of the 
Amended Decree of Divorce rather than the actual date of the divorce. The Magistrate should 
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reconsider these QDROs." 
For attorney fees to be awarded on appeal pursuant to the provisions ofl.C.12-121, the entire 
appeal must have been brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably and without foundation. Benz 
v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, 231-232, 268 P. 3d l 167,1183-1184 (2012). Based on this 
standard, attorney fees incurred by Ms. Reed in Dr. Reed's second appeal to the District Court should 
not have been awarded to Ms. Reed pursuant to the provisions ofl.C.12-121. 
Judge Griffin stated on page 8 of his MEMORANDUM OPINION that "Neither party is 
awarded fees on appeal." R. Vol. 5, p. 1219. Ms. Reed has failed to make any argument that Judge 
Griffin abused his discretion in denying her request for an award of attorney fees incurred in the 
district court appeal. 
C. ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN THIS APPEAL TO THE IDAHO SUPREME 
COURT: 
For attorney fees to be awarded on appeal pursuant to the provisions ofl.C.12-121, the entire 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court must have been brought or pursued frivolously, unreasonably 
and without foundation. Benz v. D.L. Evans Bank, 152 Idaho 215, p.231-232, 268 P. 3d 
1167, 1183-1184 (2012). Where a legitimate issue of fact or a legitimate issue of law is made in an 
appeal, attorney fees and costs will not be awarded under I.C.12-121 even though the losing party 
has asserted other factual or legal claims which are determined to be frivolous, unreasonable or 
without foundation. Brannon v. City of Coeur d'Alene, 153 Idaho 843,857,292 P. 3d 234. 248 
(2012). Under this standard, Ms. Reed is not entitled to an award of attorney fees and costs in this 
appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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CONCLUSION 
JudgeWayman'svaluation andawardofthestockinMountainHealthCare,Inc.,toDr.Reed 
should be set aside. The equalizing judgment which was entered against Dr. Reed should also be 
set aside. The judgment for attorney fees should be set aside. The Court should order Ms. Reed to 
deliver any money or property she received when she executed on these judgments to Dr. Reed. 
Judge Griffin's decision to affirm those parts of Judge Wayman's decision discussed above 
should be reversed. The matter should be remanded back to the trial court for further proceedings. 
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Q. And that was at your own request; isn't that--
A. Yes. Related to my husband's addiction. 
(Inaudible discussion between counsel) 
A. Yes, the 
MR. PALMER: We have a stipulation for admissions 
here. 
MISS GRAHAM: Judge, because we're tape recording, I 
guess, we'd admit Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 1, 2, 40, 41, 
42, 43, 44 and Defendant's Exhibit L. 
A. can I see what that schedule is that the 
current? Is that our schedule? okay. 
THE COURT: correct, Mr. Palmer? 
MR. PALMER: That's accurate, Judge. 
THE COURT: Let's have all those handed to the 
court. 
MISS GRAHAM: He's gonna -- you gotta answer his 
question. 
A. Yes. I'm sorry. 
THE COURT: well, before we do that, let's have the 
clerk mark them all admitted into evidence. 
(Plaintiff's Exhibit Nos. 1, 2, 40 thru 44 -
Admitted) 
(Defendant's Exhibit L - Admitted) 
Q. Okay. I'm not sure where I left off. 
A. You asked about me voluntarily reducing my work 
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